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MUNICIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
Jack M. Beermann*
The fundamental principle in the law of municipal liability under
§ 1983 is that municipalities may be held liable only for their own con-
duct, not for the conduct of municipal employees. Stated somewhat
differently, municipalities may not be held vicariously liable for the
conduct of municipal employees but rather can be held liable only
when municipal policy is the moving force behind the violation. While
this principle is simple to state, it has proven difficult to apply.
The Supreme Court has not developed its municipal liability juris-
prudence in a manner that is consistent with its methodology in other
§ 1983 areas. The Court has employed a variety of interpretive meth-
odologies in § 1983 cases, the most important of which is the incorpo-
ration of well-established common law doctrines into the application
of § 1983. These common law doctrines include: (1) the common law
of 1871, on the theory that Congress intended to incorporate well-
established common law doctrines into the tort-like remedy it was cre-
ating; and (2) contemporary common law, on the theory that Congress
did not intend to freeze outdated common law doctrines into § 1983.
The Court's municipal liability jurisprudence differs in that it is domi-
nated by an underdeveloped analysis of text and legislative history
with little attention to either the common law background against
which the statute was passed or more recent common law develop-
ments, both of which may point toward broad municipal liability for
the constitutional violations of employees. In my view, this is because
the Court is concerned about the policy implications of broad vicari-
ous municipal liability.
Plaintiffs, in search of the deep pocket, continually construct inge-
nious theories for holding municipalities responsible for the conduct
of municipal employees. The Court's reaction to these efforts has
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been mixed, apparently because some members of the Court are less
adamant than others about confining municipal liability within narrow
limits. In response to arguments for broader municipal liability, the
Court has allowed for such liability beyond violations occurring pursu-
ant to a formally adopted, unconstitutional, municipal policy. The
Court has made four key doctrinal decisions that broaden the scope of
municipal liability: (1) the municipal policy itself does not have to be
unconstitutional;1 (2) the policy need not have been adopted by the
highest municipal legislative body or executive official but rather mu-
nicipalities may be held liable for the decisions of an official with final
authority over an area of municipal activity; 2 (3) the decision of one
with final authority need not be framed as a general rule to cover all
similar situations but rather can appear to govern only the single situa-
tion at hand;3 and (4) municipal policies such as "failure to train" may
be actionable even where an actual policy is difficult to identify.4
These decisions have caused a great deal of litigation, and some confu-
sion, over the appropriate situations for municipal liability.
The confusion over the appropriate circumstances for holding mu-
nicipalities liable, the relaxation of municipal immunities in state law,
and the firm position of vicarious liability in tort law generally, call for
a reexamination of the Court's rules regarding § 1983 municipal liabil-
ity. Justice Stevens has consistently called for vicarious municipal lia-
bility,5 and recently Justice Breyer, joined by two additional members
of the Court, called for reexamination of the Court's restrictions on
municipal liability.6 From the opposite perspective, elimination of
municipal liability or restriction of such liability to violations resulting
from unconstitutional formally adopted municipal policies may be
more consistent with the views of a majority of the current Court.
Moving in either direction to a clearer rule would have significant
benefits in terms of reducing uncertainty and litigation.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the origins of the
Court's municipal liability jurisprudence from the outright rejection of
municipal liability in Monroe v. Pape7 through the adoption of the
1. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985); City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 387 (1988).
2. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986).
3. See, e.g., id. at 480.
4. See, e.g., Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823.
5. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 835-40 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
6. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-32 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
7. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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"municipal policy or custom" standard of liability.8 This section casts
a critical eye on the Court's use of the text and legislative history of
§ 1983. Part II describes in detail the Court's municipal liability juris-
prudence and explains how the Court's rulings have created uncer-
tainty and thus contributed to a great deal of litigation over § 1983
municipal liability. 9 The Article concludes with some observations on
vicarious municipal liability.10
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AND THE
REJECTION OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The Supreme Court's § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence be-
gins with Monroe v. Pape,11 which is also the most widely noted § 1983
case, since it established that local officials could be held liable in
damages for their constitutional violations.12 In Monroe, City of Chi-
cago police officers were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the plaintiff by entering his home and arresting him
without a warrant and by holding him for several hours in the police
station without bringing charges. 13 In addition to suing the individual
officer, the plaintiff sued the City of Chicago, hoping to recover dam-
ages from the city itself.14 The Court unanimously held that the city
was not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action because it was not a
"person" within the meaning of the statute.15
A. The Sherman Amendment
Because § 1983 does not explicitly address municipal liability, and
because the word "person" leaves some doubt as to Congress' intent,
the Court needed to look beyond the text of § 1983 to decide whether
municipalities were proper § 1983 defendants. It found its answer in
8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. For this Article, I decided to focus on primary materials to take as fresh a look as possible
at the case law and the legislative history underlying the § 1983 municipal liability question.
Thus, I have cited very little of the valuable secondary authorities on this subject. There are, of
course, many valuable articles on the subject but I thought it was important, especially in looking
at the legislative history, to be influenced as little as possible by secondary sources. After this
Article was written, I did read an excellent review of the legislative history surrounding the
enactment at § 1983 and the rejection of the Sherman Amendment. See Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Reflections on the Legislative History of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 31 URB. LAW
(forthcoming 1999).
11. 365 U.S. 167.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 169-71.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 191-92.
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some legislative history related to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, of
which § 1983 was a part.16 The primary authority for the Moneil
Court's conclusion that cities are not "persons" within the meaning of
§ 1983 was the rejection in the House of Representatives of an
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1871 passed in the Senate that
would have made cities liable for the failure to prevent private vio-
lence within city boundaries. 17
This failed amendment, known as the Sherman Amendment, 18 was
designed to deal with the widespread problem of racial violence in the
South directed at Blacks and their supporters, i.e., Republicans.' 9
Some members of the Forty-second Congress apparently believed that
local government liability would force reluctant local governments to
take action against violence directed at the newly freed slaves and
their supporters that the governments had previously been unwilling
to prevent. Paired with § 1985(3), a provision providing a civil action
against private conspiracies to deprive persons of their rights, the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 would have created a comprehensive scheme for
attacking private violence against Blacks and their allies in the strug-
gle for full membership in society.20
The legislative history of the failed Sherman Amendment reveals
that opposition was based on constitutional and federalism objections
16. Id. at 188-91.
17. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-89; CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704, 725 (1871).
18. There were actually two versions of the Sherman Amendment, and the Court's analysis is
based on the second version. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91. The first version, as proposed, de-
clared that all of the inhabitants of a county, city, or parish are liable in damages for violence
depriving the victim of any federal right (including racially motivated violence). CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 663. Procedurally, the proposal instructed victims to sue the "county, city,
or parish" in which the violence occurred and then enforce any judgment in such an action by
levying on "any property, real or personal, of any person in said county, city, or parish." Id. The
proposal further provided that the local government could recover the full amount of the judg-
ment from the actual perpetrators. Id. This version passed the Senate and was rejected by the
House with no discussion, per the instructions of the Republican leadership. Id. at 725. The
second version of the Sherman Amendment, which is the one referred to by the Supreme Court
in several municipal liability decisions including Monell and Monroe, created liability only for
the city, county or parish itself and did not provide for enforcement of judgments against in-
habitants. Id. at 798; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe, 365
U.S. at 167. This version was passed by the Senate and rejected by the House after extensive
debates centering on the constitutionality of imposing a peacekeeping obligation on municipali-
ties. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text. After the rejection of this second version of
the Sherman Amendment, Congress approved a measure, currently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1986,
creating liability against persons who know of conspiracies to deprive victims of federal rights
and who fail to act to prevent such deprivations. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 804; see
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190.
19. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 763.
20. See Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme Court's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 Sup. CT.
REv. 199.
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to the imposition of liability on municipalities for the conduct of third
parties. The view was expressed that such liability would be unconsti-
tutional because some municipal governments might not have the
power under state law to combat violence by third parties. The feder-
alism objection was that Congress lacked the power to impose the
peacekeeping obligation on local governments.
The controversy surrounding the rejection of the Sherman Amend-
ment was relied upon by the Court in rejecting municipal liability in
toto, even municipal liability founded upon the municipality's own ac-
tions.2' One aim of this Article is to establish that the Court seriously
overstates the importance of the rejection of the Sherman Amend-
ment, and that the rejection of the amendment is not strong authority
for rejecting municipal liability generally and vicarious municipal lia-
bility in particular for two reasons. First, the arguments made in Con-
gress against the Sherman Amendment were not arguments against
municipal liability generally, rather they were arguments directed at
particular perceived problems with the Sherman Amendment. Sec-
ond, the rejection of the Sherman Amendment was not, as the Court
has claimed, particularly resounding. In fact, two versions of the
amendment passed in the Senate,22 and at least one was agreed to by a
conference committee,2 3 indicating some support for it even in the
House. Thus, no broad conclusions regarding municipal liability
should be drawn from the rejection of the Sherman Amendment.
The Court characterized the objections voiced against the Sherman
Amendment's imposition of peacekeeping obligations on municipali-
ties as opposition to municipal liability generally.24 The Court's deci-
sion was made in the face of a strong textual argument that Congress
included cities in its definition of "person. '25 Just two months prior to
the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Congress passed a Dictionary Act
which provided that "the word 'person' may extend and be applied to
bodies politic and corporate. 12 6 In rejecting the argument that this
Act established that cities were "persons" within the meaning of
§ 1983, the Court noted that the definition of "person" was permis-
sive, and stated that "[t]he response of the Congress to the proposal
[the Sherman Amendment] to make municipalities liable for certain
actions being brought within federal purview ... was so antagonistic
21. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191-92 (1961).
22. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704, 779 (1871).
23. Id. at 804.
24. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91.
25. Id. at 191.
26. Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431; see Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190.
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that we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particu-
lar Act to include them. '27 Opposition to the Sherman Amendment
thus became opposition to municipal liability generally.
In subsequent cases, the Court repeated its view that the reasons for
rejecting the Sherman Amendment entailed the complete rejection of
municipal liability in § 1983 cases, but the evidence it cited for this
view never went beyond arguments for rejecting municipal liability for
failure to prevent third parties from violating civil rights.28 Constitu-
tional objections voiced in Congress to imposing peacekeeping duties
on municipalities were transformed by the Court into objections con-
cerning federal power to impose liability upon municipalities for their
own civil rights violations. For example, in Moor v. County of Ala-
meda,2 9 the Court stated that "the root of [the Sherman Amend-
ment's] difficulties stemmed from serious legislative concern as to
Congress' constitutional power to impose liability on political subdivi-
sions of the States. '30 But a careful reading of the Court's citations to
the debates in Congress reveals that most of the comments, fairly
read, rejected only municipal responsibility for violations committed
by third parties within municipal borders and did not reach the issue
of whether the federal government has the power to make municipali-
ties liable for their own violations.31 In fact, there are also references
to permissible forms of municipal liability, such as municipal liability
27. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
28. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 708.
31. For example, Representative Willard's comments, which the Moor Court cites for congres-
sional doubts about its power to "impose liability on political subdivisions of the States," repeat-
edly refer to imposing duties, not liabilities, on subdivisions. Id. Further, he compared the
Sherman Amendment unfavorably with laws that impose liability on a community where it is
proven that the community was at fault, implying that he might favor municipal liability when
the municipality was at fault. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704, 791 (1871). It should also
be noted that Representative Willard explicitly stated that his comments addressed the wisdom,
and not the constitutionality, of the Sherman Amendment. Id. at 791; see id. at 795 (remarks of
Rep. Blair). The Sherman Amendment
claims the power in the General Government to go into the States of this Union and lay
such obligations as it may please upon the municipalities, which are the creations of the
States alone ... here it is proposed not to carry into effect an obligation which rests
upon the municipality, but to create that obligation.
Id. Rep. Burchard also stated, "there is no duty imposed by the Constitution of the United
States, or usually by State laws, upon a county to protect the people of that county against the
commission of the offenses herein enumerated." Id.
[T]he only power to charge a municipality of a State for the destruction of property by
a mob arises from the laws of the State .... I want to know where is the authority for
making a State corporation, an integral part of the State, a county, responsible in a
court of the United States for damages without limit for the destruction of the life of a
citizen by riot?
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for breach of contract, where the municipality voluntarily took upon
itself the obligation to perform its contract, 32 thus indicating that Con-
gress did not reject municipal liability in toto.
The comments cited in Moor that came the closest to a complete
rejection of municipal liability are those of Representative Poland,
mainly because he used the word "liability" while others referred to
constitutional problems with imposing an "obligation" on local gov-
ernments, i.e., the obligation to keep the peace. Representative Po-
land discussed the Sherman Amendment in terms of an attempt by
Congress "to impose a liability on a mere State municipality, a mere
subdivision of the State. '33 He also used the language of obligation,
however, stating that he interpreted the House's rejection of the Sher-
man Amendment as signifying that "the House had solemnly decided
that in their judgment Congress had no constitutional power to im-
pose any obligation upon county and town organizations. '34 He also
stated that the House insisted that before it would agree to any civil
rights act "that the section imposing liability upon towns and counties
must go out."' 35 While it is possible to read Representative Poland's
use of the word "liability" as a complete rejection of municipal liabil-
ity of any form, because the discussion was always of the Sherman
Amendment itself, not the general idea of municipal liability, he may
not have intended his comments to go so far.
Another set of comments that can be read as completely rejecting
the idea of municipal liability attack in principle the idea that the fed-
eral government has the power to address any legislation to the state
or a unit of the state.36 These comments start from the premise that
Id. (remarks of Rep. Bingham). Because the Sherman Amendment provided the context for all
of the comments regarding municipal liability, there is little discussion of municipal liability for
violations committed by municipal officials.
32. See id. at 795 (remarks of Rep. Blair).
[W]hen a municipality, under the authority given by a State, makes a contract, it
thereby lays itself liable to every remedy upon that contract, and it is liable to be sued
by its own consent, and with the consent of the State that created it, in any court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter of that contract.
Id. It is unclear whether Rep. Blair is saying that consent to be sued is implicit in the making of
the contract or that additional consent to be sued would be necessary.
33. Id. at 793 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 804 (emphasis added).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., id. at 788 (remarks of Rep. Kerr).
It has many times been solemnly decided by the Supreme Court that these agencies
adopted by the States to aid in local administration are above the touch or control of
any power, are subject only to the exclusive regulation of the States.... If Congress can
invade the counties or cities for the purposes contemplated by this measure it can also
the States themselves and can then absorb, divert, and consume the treasury, property
and rights of the States.
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local governments are purely creatures of the state, and in fact, are
arms of the state and non-entities as far as the federal government is
concerned. Being purely creatures of the state, the federal govern-
ment has no business directing its commands to local governments.
Legislation, on this theory, should be directed either at the states
themselves or at the people, but not at local governments who are not
entities separate from the states themselves.
Thus, while there is some diversity among the comments in opposi-
tion to the Sherman Amendment, by far the most frequently ex-
pressed constitutional objection to the amendment was that Congress
lacked the power to impose the peacekeeping obligation on local gov-
ernments. While Representative Poland did use the word "liability,"
he made no special effort to distinguish his opposition from the gen-
eral opposition to liability for failure to keep the peace that was pro-
posed in the Sherman Amendment. The Court went too far when it
interpreted the rejection of the Sherman Amendment as implying a
rejection of municipal liability generally.
In concluding that the rejection of the Sherman Amendment en-
tailed a complete rejection of municipal liability, the Court also ig-
nored the fact that two versions of the Sherman Amendment passed
the Senate and that after the House rejected the first version, the Con-
ference Committee agreed to a more moderate version, which ulti-
mately was also rejected in the House.37 Given the Senate's repeated
acceptance of municipal liability for the violations of third parties, and
the Conference Committee's agreement on a version of such liability,
it is unfair to read the rejection of the Sherman Amendment as a re-
sounding rejection of all forms of municipal liability.
It appears likely that the House's rejection of the first version of the
Sherman Amendment was due to the leadership's disagreement with
Id; see also id. at 793 (remarks of Rep. Poland) ("What are cities and counties? They are munici-
pal subdivisions of States .... With these local subdivisions we have nothing to do. We can
impose no duty upon them; we can impose no liability upon them in any manner whatever.").
37. For a review of the rejection of the Sherman Amendment, see Russell Glazer, Comment,
The Sherman Amendment: Congressional Rejection of Communal Liability for Civil Rights Viola-
tions, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1371 (1992). The author of the Comment concludes that the Sherman
Amendment was rejected not because of federalism concerns with imposing liability on munici-
palities but rather because of the House's view that it was improper to impose liability on a
community for the misconduct of a few members of the community. Id. at 1375-76. The Com-
ment is persuasive on the reasons for rejecting the first version of the Sherman Amendment, but
then the Comment, in my view, improperly ignores the substance of the attacks on the second
version that were made on the floor of the House when it concludes that the second version was
rejected for the same reasons as the first. Rather, it appears that while the leadership was ini-
tially most concerned about the communal liability point, given the many comments on the fed-
eralism point that were made during debate on the second version, the Amendment's ultimate
rejection must be at least somewhat attributable to the concerns expressed in those comments.
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the amendment's provision making all inhabitants of the locality liable
and allowing enforcement of judgments against the property of any
inhabitant, without regard to whether the particular inhabitant was
part of the riot.38 Some senators expressed disagreement with this as-
pect of the Sherman Amendment,39 and Senator Sherman explained
the rejection of the first version by the House as owing to the view
that enforcement of a judgment on an innocent member of the com-
munity "might be made the means of oppression. ' 40 Further, the
principal alteration of the proposal that emerged from the Conference
Committee after the House's rejection of the first version was the
elimination of this feature and substitution of a provision allowing for
enforcement of judgments against the municipalities themselves, with
power in the federal judge to order municipalities to raise funds to
satisfy the judgments. 41 This would make all inhabitants of the local-
ity share in the loss, rather than imposing it on one unlucky person
whose property happened to be easy to reach.
In statutory interpretation it is often viewed as dangerous to try to
garner the meaning of one provision from debates surrounding the
rejection of another. Given the diversity of views within Congress on
the desirability of the Sherman Amendment, it is particularly danger-
ous to read the rejection of the Sherman Amendment as Congress
rejecting anything more than the actual terms of the various versions
of that amendment itself. In legal reasoning terms, the Sherman
Amendment debates are no more than dicta regarding the meaning of
§ 1983, and as a matter of statutory construction conventions, efforts
to discern the meaning of § 1983 from debates surrounding the rejec-
tion of the Sherman Amendment yield, at best, weak arguments.
B. Movement Toward Municipal Liability
The weakness of the Court's reasoning rejecting municipal liability
became even more evident when the Court revisited the idea of mu-
nicipal liability fifteen years later. Before examining the Monell
Court's reversal of Monroe's absolute rejection of § 1983 municipal
liability, it is worthwhile to consider some of the steps along the road.
The background of the expansion of tort liability in the private sphere
during the 1960s and 1970s included well-established principles of vi-
carious liability of private entities in tort law. Further, the fairness of
vicarious liability of private entities was not really questioned during
38. See Glazer, supra note 37, at 1402 n.161.
39. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 704, 707 (1871).
40. Id. at 822 (remarks of Sen. Sherman), quoted in Glazer, supra note 37, at 1402 n.161.
41. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 749.
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this period, at least as to employee conduct that in some way fur-
thered the business interests of the employer. At the same time, state
courts and legislatures were revamping sovereign and municipal im-
munity doctrines to make local governments liable in a much wider
variety of circumstances. 42
Thus, it should not have been surprising that federal courts, paral-
leling state tort law developments, began to recognize the unfairness
of failing to hold municipalities liable for injuries caused by municipal
unconstitutional conduct. Arguments were made (some accepted and
some rejected) for municipality accountability for constitutional viola-
tions under certain narrow circumstances. For example, at least one
lower court accepted the argument that a city was a "person" when
the only relief sought was equitable.43 While the Supreme Court re-
jected this view, it did hint at another way around the limited defini-
tion of "person"-a suit directly under the Fourteenth Amendment
against a municipality, which would not be limited by the text of
§ 1983. 44
In City of Kenosha v. Bruno,45 the plaintiffs sued for injunctive re-
lief after the city refused to renew their liquor licenses, apparently
because of nude dancing at their establishments. 46 They claimed that
the failure to hold adversary hearings before the denials violated due
process. 47 In light of Monroe, the city argued that it was not a proper
defendant to a § 1983 action, even when the only relief requested was
equitable.48 The Court first determined that federal jurisdiction was
not available under the jurisdictional provision of the Civil Rights Act
of 187149 because the city was not a person under § 1983, thus re-
42. For case law regarding municipal immunity, see, for example, Molitor v. Kaneland Com-
munity Unit District No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (N.D. I11. 1959) (abolishing Illinois school district
immunity); Enghauser Manufacturing Co. v. Eriksson Engineering Ltd., 451 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio
1983) (abolishing Ohio municipal immunity); Becker v. Beaudoin, 261 A.2d 896 (R.I. 1970)
(abolishing Rhode Island municipal immunity); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va.
1975) (abolishing West Virginia municipal immunity); and Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115
N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962) (abolishing Wisconsin municipal immunity). For legislative action, see,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 412:3 (Supp. 1979) (abrogating
immunity to extent of governmental insurance); and N.J. REV. STAT. tit. 59 (Supp. 1980). For a
critique of legislative action in the governmental immunity area, see Ann Judith Gellis, Legisla-
tive Reform of Governmental Tort Liability: Overreacting to Minimal Evidence, 21 RUTGERS L.J.
375 (1990).
43. See Misurelli v. City of Racine, 346 F. Supp. 43, 45 n.1 (E.D. Wis 1972) (three judge court),
rev'd, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
44. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 515.
45. 412 U.S. 507.
46. Id. at 507.
47. Id. at 508.
48. Id. at 507.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994).
636 [Vol. 48:627
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jecting the argument that cities were persons when the only relief
sought was equitable.50 Rather than stopping there, however, the
Court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
whether jurisdiction was available under the general federal question
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 5 1 The Court also commented on the due
process standards that would apply if the district court determined
that it had jurisdiction, noting that its recent cases had established the
standards to be applied to due process claims, including due process
challenges to deprivations of liquor licenses.52 Justice Brennan, in a
concurring opinion, tried to explain the importance of the Court's ap-
parent determination that if the then existing $10,000 amount in con-
troversy requirement for federal jurisdiction were met, the plaintiffs
could sue the city under the general federal question statute.
53
While it was never clearly explained in either opinion in Bruno, the
reasoning amounted to a holding that restrictions inherent in § 1983
actions might be avoided by pleading a Bivens action directly under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brennan cited, inter alia, Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,54
implying that the Bivens action might exist because Bivens defendants
need not necessarily be persons as defined by the Court's § 1983 juris-
prudence. 55 The Bivens action was a judicial creation, and the text of
§ 1983 is not relevant to developing the contours of that action.
The Court's focus in Bruno on jurisdiction results from the fact that
the basis of federal jurisdiction over Bivens actions is different from
the basis of federal jurisdiction over § 1983 actions. Section 1983 ac-
tions may be brought in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, a juris-
dictional provision passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.56
Jurisdiction under § 1343 is limited to actions arising under federal
civil rights statutes.57 Bivens actions, by contrast, are brought in fed-
eral court under the general federal question statute58 because Bivens
actions arise directly under the Constitution, not under any federal
civil rights statute. At the time Bruno was decided, this distinction
was important because the general federal question statute had an
50. Bruno, 412 U.S. at 513.
51. Id. at 514 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
52. Id. at 515.
53. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54. Id. (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971)).
55. Id.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 1331.
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amount in controversy requirement of $10,000, 59 while § 1343 has
never had such a requirement. Plaintiffs with small claims were thus
relegated to state court unless they could fit their claim into a special-
ized federal statute without an amount in controversy requirement,
like § 1343. Now that the amount in controversy requirement for gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction has been repealed, 60 the distinction
no longer has any practical importance.
It is somewhat remarkable that the Court would apparently so eas-
ily allow plaintiffs to plead their way around a restriction on municipal
liability that had been founded upon the important federalism con-
cerns articulated in Monroe and subsequent cases. In my view, this
reflects the weakness of the normative foundations of Monroe's rejec-
tion of municipal liability. If the Court had remained committed to
the Monroe Court's view that federal courts should not impose liabil-
ity on local governments, it surely would not have allowed plaintiffs to
avoid the rule against such liability with a pleading trick. Further,
under current law regarding the availability of Bivens actions, the
Court would almost certainly not allow a plaintiff to bring a Bivens
action against a local government. The Court would likely hold that
the existence of § 1983 is a "special factor counseling hesitation" and
thus federal courts should not provide remedies in constitutional tort
cases against local governments beyond those allowed under § 1983.61
It should also be noted that Bruno did not lead to large scale avoid-
ance of the bar against § 1983 municipal liability. There are no other
cases allowing Bivens actions against municipalities, and it is unclear if
the doctrinal significance of Bruno was widely understood at the time
it was decided. In fact, it is not even clear that the Court itself focused
on the relationship between its holding and its previous rejection of
§ 1983 municipal liability. While Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
cites Bivens,62 and he seems to have understood the relationship be-
tween Bruno and Monroe, it is impossible to know whether others had
a similar understanding.
Plaintiffs attempted other ways around Monroe's bar on municipal
liability that are worth noting. In Aldinger v. Howard,63 the plaintiff
attempted to bring state law claims against a county in federal court
through the device of pendent jurisdiction.64 The paradigm case of
59. Id.
60. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1968).
61. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
289, 356-58 (1995).
62. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973).
63. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
64. Id. at 1.
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pendent jurisdiction involves a plaintiff with both federal and state
claims against a defendant. Pendent jurisdiction in such a case allows
the assertion of state law claims against the non-diverse defendant if
the state and federal claims arise out of a "common nucleus of opera-
tive fact."'65 Federal jurisdiction over the case is founded upon the
claims arising under federal law. In Aldinger, however, while the
plaintiff had viable § 1983 claims against county officials, the plaintiff
had no federal claims against the county itself since the county was
not a person under § 1983.66 The plaintiff was thus attempting to use
pendent jurisdiction to bring a defendant into federal court over
whom there would otherwise be no federal jurisdiction.
The Court rejected the idea of "pendent party" jurisdiction over the
county, holding that without some independent basis for federal juris-
diction,67 state law claims against the county must be brought in state
court.68 The Aldinger Court understood that the plaintiff was seeking
to avoid the Monroe rule, and it explicitly stated that its rejection of
pendent party jurisdiction over the county was heavily influenced by
the exclusion of counties as persons under § 1983. The Court stated
that "the refusal of Congress to authorize suits against municipal cor-
porations under the cognate provisions of § 1983 is sufficient to defeat
the asserted claim of pendent-party jurisdiction. ' 69 Aldinger illus-
trates the importance of the jurisdictional element to understanding
§ 1983.70 One important reason for bringing a § 1983 claim, rather
than whatever claims there might be under state law, is the perception
that there is an advantage to litigating claims against local government
entities and local government officials in federal court rather than
state court. Aldinger involved jurisdiction only, and the plaintiff ap-
parently thought federal jurisdiction so important that she took the
trouble and risk of constructing a theory to allow the assertion of state
law claims against the non-diverse defendant when the law was un-
clear on whether she could bring the claims in federal court.
71
Another attempt to avoid the Monroe rule, and one that is more
interesting in terms of § 1983 jurisprudence, is the argument that
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
66. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16-17.
67. The Court noted that pendent party or ancillary jurisdiction, as it is sometimes called,
might be appropriate under some circumstances such as where a party seeks to intervene to
protect property already before the federal court, but no such circumstance was alleged to exist
in Aldinger. See id. at 9-11.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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where state law allows actions against municipalities in state court,
federal law should apply that state law doctrine to § 1983 claims in
federal court. In Moor v. County of Alameda,72 the plaintiff at-
tempted to sue a California county in federal court under § 1983. 73
The plaintiff argued that under the California Tort Claims Act, the
county was vicariously liable for the conduct of its sheriff and deputy
sheriff, and that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the state law should be ap-
plied in § 1983 actions.74
Section 1988 instructs federal courts, in exercising their civil rights
jurisdiction, to fill gaps in federal law by applying the law of the state
in which the federal court sits.75 Among the Court's reasons for re-
jecting the plaintiff's argument under § 1988 was the rather straight-
forward conclusion that because the Court held that Congress defined
person not to include municipal governments, there was no gap in
§ 1983 that needed to be filled with state law.76 The Court stated that
allowing a civil rights suit against a municipality, even in a state in
which municipalities are vicariously liable for torts of employees,
would be "less than consistent with the Court's prior holding ... that
Congress did not intend to render municipal corporations liable to
federal civil rights claims under § 1983." 77 Without a gap in § 1983,
there was no occasion for looking to state law concerning municipal
liability.
C. Establishment of Municipal Liability
Finally, in Monell v. Department of Social Services,78 the Court
overruled Monroe and held that cities are persons subject to suit
under § 1983, but only when the violation results from city policy or
custom. 79 The Monell Court took a fresh look at both the debates
regarding the rejected Sherman Amendment and the debates regard-
ing § 1983 itself, and concluded that Congress intended to include mu-
nicipal governments within § 1983's definition of person.80
With regard to the debates surrounding the Sherman Amendment,
the Monell Court recognized that the opposition to the amendment
72. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
73. Id. at 695.
74. Id. at 696.
75. See Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 57-65 (1989).
76. Moor, 411 U.S. at 701-02.
77. Id. at 706.
78. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
79. Id. at 690-91.
80. Id. at 673-83.
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centered around the imposition of the peacekeeping obligation on
municipalities. 81 The Court observed that "opponents expressly dis-
tinguished between imposing an obligation to keep the peace and
merely imposing civil liability for damages on a municipality that was
obligated by state law to keep the peace, but which had not in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. '82 Further, the Court noted that
even Representative Poland, a staunch opponent of the Sherman
Amendment, "indicated that Congress could constitutionally confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts to entertain suits seeking to hold mu-
nicipalities liable for using their authorized powers in violation of the
Constitution. '83 The Court concluded that the constitutional objec-
tions to the Sherman Amendment were not probative on whether
Congress intended to impose liability on municipalities under § 1983
for their own violations.84
Turning to the positive case for municipal liability under § 1983, the
Court relied upon four factors to support its conclusion that Congress
intended to include local governments as defendants in § 1983 ac-
tions.85 First, the Court stated that since Congress intended § 1983 "to
give a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights
... [and] Congress intended [§ 1983] to be broadly construed, there is
no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would have been
excluded from the sweep of § [1983]."86 Second, the Court noted that
a Member of Congress, Representative Bingham, linked § 1983 to his
view that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make cities lia-
ble for taking private property for public use without compensation.
87
Third, the Court observed that municipal corporations were treated
like other corporations and were frequently sued in federal courts,
and that this was "well known to Members of Congress."88 Fourth,
the Court noted that the Dictionary Act, which was passed just two
months before § 1983, provided that in federal legislation "the word
'person' may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate...
unless the context shows that such words were intended to be used in
a more limited sense."89
81. Id.
82. Id. at 679.
83. Id. at 679-80.
84. Monell, 436 U.S. at 683.
85. Id. at 683-89.
86. Id. at 686.
87. Id. at 686-87.
88. Id. at 688.
89. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 25, 1871, § 2, 16 Stat. 431).
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D. Limitations on Municipal Liability
Having made the case for municipal § 1983 liability, the Monell
Court stated that municipal liability was limited to situations in which
"action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a
constitutional tort."90 The Court explicitly rejected vicarious munici-
pal liability for the constitutional torts of municipal employees: "[i]n
particular, we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor-or, in other words, a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."91
The Court offered two reasons for its limitation of municipal liabil-
ity to violations resulting from official municipal policy. First, the lan-
guage of § 1983, which makes "persons" liable when they "subject or
cause" the victim "to be subjected" to a deprivation of a federal right,
indicated to the Court that defendants may be held liable only when
they cause a violation.92 The Court concluded that pure vicarious lia-
bility would not meet § 1983's causation requirement. 93 Second, the
Court once again relied upon the rejection of the Sherman Amend-
ment. The Court stated that "creation of a federal law of respondeat
superior would have raised all the constitutional problems associated
with the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose
not to impose because it thought imposition of such an obligation
unconstitutional." 94
The Court's reliance on the causation language in § 1983 is a much
stronger argument than its reliance on the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment. In the end, however, in light of the general interpretive
principles the Court has enunciated in its § 1983 jurisprudence, the
Court has not offered a satisfactory justification for rejecting vicarious
municipal liability. Turning first to the rejection of the Sherman
Amendment, the Court's statement that imposing vicarious liability
on municipalities for the torts of their employees "would have raised
all of the constitutional problems associated with the obligation to
keep the peace" 95 is a serious overstatement. Expecting a municipal-
ity to prevent its employees from violating federal rights is quite dif-
90. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Notice, however, that the Court does not limit municipal liability
to liability for municipal policies that are themselves unconstitutional, but allowed for liability
when "action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort."
Id. Working out when liability should attach for a municipal policy that is not itself unconstitu-
tional has been very difficult. See infra notes 137-145 and accompanying text.
91. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
93. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
94. Id. at 693.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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ferent from placing upon a municipality the obligation to prevent
private citizens from engaging in riotous conduct.96 In the former sit-
uation, federal law does not require the municipality to engage in an
entirely new set of activities. Rather, federal law requires merely that
in conducting its affairs, the municipality must not, through its agents,
violate federal law.97
The difference between liability for failure to keep the peace and
liability for the conduct of municipal agents can be seen from the per-
spective of the opponents of the Sherman Amendment. The primary
problem with the Sherman Amendment was that a municipality might
not have the power under state law to take the actions that the Sher-
man Amendment would have required. By contrast, when the munic-
ipality is acting through its employees, the municipality has an
obligation to confine its actions within the limits of the Constitution.
State law cannot authorize municipalities to violate the Constitution.
As long as an employee's action is within the scope of municipal em-
ployment, so that vicarious liability would attach under normal cir-
cumstances, any constitutional question regarding federal power to
impose vicarious liability is of a different order than objections to lia-
bility for the actions of non-employees not acting on behalf of the
municipality.98 Further, as discussed above, the scope of the debates
surrounding the Sherman Amendment cast serious doubt on using the
rejection of the Sherman Amendment as authority for construing
§ 1983. The opponents of the Sherman Amendment simply were not
addressing any question beyond whether municipalities should be lia-
ble for damages caused by third parties rioting within municipal
boundaries.
The Court's reliance on § 1983's causation requirement is a more
acceptable method of construction than its reliance on the rejection of
the Sherman Amendment, but it may ultimately prove an unsatisfac-
tory basis for rejecting vicarious liability. The statute's causation re-
quirement suggests a limitation on § 1983 liability, and the Court
concluded that "causation [is] absent" when the only basis for munici-
pal liability is vicarious liability for the conduct of municipal employ-
ees.99 To evaluate the Court's causation requirement reasoning, it is
necessary to briefly consider the Court's methodology more generally.
96. Id. at 694.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 691.
99. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
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E. Exploring Vicarious Municipal Liability
The most significant problem with the Court's municipal liability
jurisprudence is that it has developed without regard to the interpre-
tive methodologies that the Court employs in other § 1983 contexts. 100
The Court has adopted a variety of interpretive methodologies to
round out the contours of the § 1983 remedy. The sources of law that
the Court has employed to develop the § 1983 remedy as a "species of
tort law" include: (1) the common law as it existed in 1871 (on the
theory that Congress probably intended to incorporate well-estab-
lished common law doctrines into the remedy it was creating); (2) con-
temporary common law principles (on the theory that Congress would
not have intended to freeze outdated doctrines into the remedy it was
creating); (3) the law of the state in which the federal court hearing
the case sits (because Congress, in § 1988, instructed federal courts to
use the law of the forum state to fill gaps in § 1983); and (4) federal
common law principles derived from the policies underlying § 1983.101
In addition to the reasons for looking to particular common law
sources discussed above, resorting to common law principles is justi-
fied because § 1983 is viewed as a "species of tort liability" that should
be construed consistent with normal tort law principles. 0 2
The Court avoided applying background tort law principles to the
question of municipal liability because it found, in the causation lan-
guage of § 1983, congressional rejection of vicarious municipal liabil-
ity.103 However, had the Court treated the issue as it has treated other
§ 1983 textual issues, it would not have found so much meaning in
§ 1983's causation concept. Congress' use of the word "causes" in
§ 1983 would have been taken as a general cue to consult general
common law tort concepts, rather than answer the question
definitively.10 4
100. See generally Beermann, supra note 75 (discussing methods the Supreme Court has used
to fill gaps in § 1983).
101. Id.
102. In Monroe, this was part of the justification for not requiring a high standard of culpabil-
ity such as willfulness. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1968). The Court stated that under
ordinary tort law principles, people are responsible for the natural and probable consequences of
their actions, and that § 1983 should be read against the background of tort liability. Id.
103. Id. at 191.
104. For a comparison with the Court's use of the word "causes," see the Court's holding in
Monroe. Id. at 167. The Court has acknowledged that some municipal policy will always be a
cause in fact of a constitutional violation by a municipal employee committed in the course of
employment because the decision to perform the function for which the employee was hired is a
municipal policy. Id. at 190-91. For example, in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 415-16 (1997), the Court noted that the normally innocuous decision to hire a particu-
lar employee could be viewed as the "cause" of that employee's constitutional violations. Id. at
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Given the interpretive methodologies traditionally employed in
§ 1983 cases, reliance on the statutory causation requirement is not
sufficient, on its own, to sustain the argument against vicarious munic-
ipal liability. With even more definite language, the Court has felt
free to consult the common law background to answer questions re-
garding § 1983's scope. For example, although Congress stated that
"[e]very person" is a potential § 1983 defendant, the Court has incor-
porated common law official immunities to exempt a great number of
officials (persons) from § 1983 liability. 105 Congress' use of the
phrase "subjects or causes to be subjected," under this methodology,
provides an even stronger signal to consult the background common
law, since "causes" is at least somewhat less clear than "[e]very
person."10 6
This is not to say that opening up the analysis to include the tradi-
tional sources of law in § 1983 cases would provide a clearer an-
swer.107 Background tort law principles can be used to support or
reject a rule of vicarious municipal liability, although the weight of
authority appears to be on the side of imposing vicarious liability. On
the negative side, vicarious liability principles are necessary in tort law
because normal tort law requirements of duty, breach and proximate
causation are not met when an employer is asked to answer for the
torts of an employee. 108 It is only the addition of the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior that provides a basis for holding an employer lia-
ble-tort law's traditional requirements for liability are not met.
Understood more broadly, however, common law principles can be
read to support vicarious municipal liability. Vicarious liability was
well established in tort law in 1871.109 Because the framers of § 1983
did not address the issue directly, under the Court's interpretive prin-
ciples, it should be presumed that Congress meant to incorporate the
doctrine into § 1983. Further, even if vicarious liability had not been
developed in 1871, it is so well-established in today's tort law that,
under the Court's theory, it should be incorporated into § 1983 so that
412-16. The meaning of "cause" in § 1983 is too uncertain to foreclose resort to background
understandings of the concept. Thus, the Court could have taken § 1983's language as a sugges-
tion to consult general common law liability rules.
105. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967).
106. Id. at 548.
107. For example, in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), while most members of the Court
agreed that eighteenth century common law was important in determining the proper standard
for punitive damages in § 1983 cases, the majority and dissent disagreed sharply on the content
of that law. Id. at 38-56.
108. Id. at 48-56.
109. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
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the statute does not become an out-dated anachronism. 110 Moreover,
the Court has also failed to adequately explain why it does not follow
§ 1988's apparent command to apply the law of the forum state to fill
gaps in § 1983 cases. If § 1988 were applied, then vicarious § 1983 lia-
bility should exist in those states in which municipalities are vicari-
ously liable for the torts of municipal employees.
The policies underlying § 1983 also send mixed signals as to whether
municipalities should be vicariously liable. The Court has consistently
identified the policies underlying § 1983 as compensating victims of
constitutional torts and deterring future violations, but deterrence no
greater than that created by the imposition of compensatory damages.
Vicarious municipal liability would improve the prospects of compen-
sation, since municipalities are more likely to have sufficient reachable
assets than individual officials. Further, this would improve deter-
rence for two reasons. First and most obviously, municipalities would
have an additional incentive to attempt to prevent employees from
committing constitutional torts.11' Second, the deeper municipal
pocket would encourage more victims of constitutional torts to bring
suit than might do so if the prospects for substantial monetary recov-
ery were dim. Even assuming that municipal liability itself creates lit-
tle extra deterrence, plaintiffs in these cases would presumably join
the individual officers as defendants, thus enhancing the deterrent ef-
fect of § 1983 each time a case is brought that might otherwise not
have been.
In addition, the same elements of fairness underlying vicarious lia-
bility generally support subjecting municipal governments to vicarious
liability in § 1983 cases. In private tort claims, the judgment has been
made that it is fair to hold employers liable for employees' torts com-
mitted in the scope of employment because employers ultimately are
the beneficiaries of the actions of employees, at least within the scope
of employment. Further, vicarious liability spreads the loss widely to
all those who share in the fortunes (or misfortunes) of the entity,
whether they be shareholders or residents. Finally, as between the
individual municipal employee and the municipality itself, it may be
fairer for the municipality to pay the damages. The numerous munici-
palities that indemnify their workers obviously agree with this
judgment.
110. For a discussion of this feature of the Court's § 1983 jurisprudence, see Beermann, supra
note 75, at 67 & n.99.
111. I say "additional" because indemnification and other factors already provide some incen-
tive for municipalities to supervise employees.
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The Monell Court rejected application of the policies underlying vi-
carious liability to § 1983 cases on the dubious grounds that these poli-
cies were also offered in favor of the Sherman Amendment.112 The
Court noted that the Sherman Amendment was supported as a device
to encourage municipalities to prevent constitutional violations and to
spread the cost of violations when they nevertheless occured, and that
neither of these justifications were sufficient "to sustain the amend-
ment.' 1 3 It simply does not follow, however, that no other provision
of the civil rights act was intended to accomplish similar goals, albeit
in a different fashion. Whatever one thinks of the rule the Court
adopted, this is very poor reasoning.
If the language of § 1983 was considered vague enough to justify
looking to common law principles to determine whether § 1983 ought
to allow for vicarious municipal liability, then it is useful to explore
just what the common law has to say about vicarious liability generally
and vicarious municipal liability in particular. As might be expected,
eighteenth century law is mixed, with good support for vicarious liabil-
ity generally, but relatively little support for vicarious municipal liabil-
ity. More recent common law principles provide stronger support for
vicarious municipal liability.
In the late eighteenth century, the vicarious liability of employers
for the torts of their employees was well established. Employers were
liable for torts committed by employees in the course of the em-
ployer's business.11 4 Difficulties and disagreements among courts,
arose in determining whether an employee's torts were committed in
the course of the employer's business. Some courts maintained a rela-
tively narrow "course of business" test, disallowing liability if an em-
ployee violated the employer's instructions and sometimes even
insisting that the employee's actions had been ordered or ratified by
the employer before liability could attach. Other courts allowed for
broader vicarious liability and held employers liable whenever a tort
was committed by an employee on duty, as long as the employee's
actions were connected to his service." 5
The most controversial area in eighteenth century vicarious liability
rules appears to have been whether employers could be held liable for
their employees' willful tortious conduct and fraudulent action. This
112. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
113. Id.
114. See King v. N.Y.C. & H. R.R. Co., 66 N.Y. 181, 184 (1876); Harold J. Laski, The Basis of
Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916-1917).
115. See Friedlander v. Texas Pac. Ry. Co., 130 U.S. 416, 425 (1888) (stating general rule that
employer is liable for all conduct of employee within course of employment, but employee's
fraud benefiting himself is not within course of employment).
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issue is important for § 1983 purposes because a great deal of uncon-
stitutional conduct, such as police brutality and equal protection viola-
tions, require intentional conduct that might be outside narrow
vicarious liability rules. While some courts applied familiar "course of
business" principles and held employers liable for torts involving more
than negligence,116 other courts were reluctant to hold employers lia-
ble for conduct beyond employee negligence. 117 A middle ground
which some courts occupied was to hold employers liable for willful
conduct only if the employer authorized, ratified, or benefited from
the malicious or fraudulent conduct. 11 8 It appears that the general
rule in the nineteenth century was that employers were liable for em-
ployee conduct that was more than negligent if the employee acted in
furtherance of the employer's business and not for purely personal
reasons that could not, in any sense, benefit the employer.
In light of these principles, if the Court were to abandon its textual
reasons for disallowing vicarious municipal liability and look instead
to background tort principles, eighteenth century vicarious liability
rules raise questions but do not present serious obstacles to vicarious
municipal liability in § 1983 cases. Even though most § 1983 claims
involve intentional or willful action, especially since negligence does
not ordinarily violate due process, vicarious liability should still attach
since in those cases in which the conduct occurs while the employee is
acting in furtherance of job related activities. For example, police bru-
tality, if committed while making an arrest is clearly within the scope
of employment and thus should give rise to vicarious liability. In cases
such as sexual harassment, and sexual or other assault, however,
courts might hold that the employee was acting out of a purely per-
sonal motive and in no sense in service to the employer when commit-
ting an assault. Thus, the conduct might be beyond the reach of
vicarious liability. While this conduct may give rise to § 1983 liability
116. Craker v. Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 668 (1875) (explaining employer is no
more likely to authorize negligence as malicious conduct); see Annotation, Civil Action for As-
sault Upon Female Person, 6 A.L.R. 985, 1007-08 (1920) (explaining employer is liable for em-
ployee assault committed while employee is engaged in employer's business even if assault was
contrary to explicit instructions of employer).
117. See, e.g., McManus v. Crickett, 120 Eng. Rep. 43 (1800) (holding principal liable for neg-
ligence of the servant but not his malice).
118. See Friedlander, 130 U.S. at 425; Milwaukee & Miss. R.R. Co. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 330, 337
(1860) (holding when employee's malicious actions result in breach of employer's contract with
third party, employer is liable for employee's conduct in tort but damages are limited to those
available in contract, and no exemplary damages are available because employer did not author-
ize or ratify employee's conduct). Finney's limitation of damages to contract damages is actually
an example of judicial reluctance to hold employers liable for malicious employee conduct; the
fact that the conduct resulted in a breach of contract is what the court relied upon to justify
holding the employer liable. Id.
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against the employee engaged in it, courts may not hold employers
vicariously liable for such conduct because of the view that the em-
ployee's motive in sexual assaulting or harassing the victim is uncon-
nected with the business of the employer.
Another, and perhaps more serious obstacle to § 1983 vicarious mu-
nicipal liability is the little support in eighteenth century law for mu-
nicipal liability generally and vicarious municipal liability more
specifically. Until the middle to late twentieth century, sovereign im-
munity shielded municipalities from tort liability. 119 Municipalities
could not be held liable for non-performance or negligent perform-
ance of governmental duties such as providing police and fire protec-
tion or maintaining streets free from obstruction.120 Further, because
municipal liability was the exceptional case, there was no developed
doctrine of vicarious municipal liability.
Despite the obstacles described above, the Court could construct a
regime of vicarious municipal liability without violating its § 1983 con-
struction practices. If the Monell Court was correct, Congress re-
jected the prevailing eighteenth century rule against municipal
liability by including municipalities as persons subject to suit under
§ 1983. Regarding vicarious municipal liability, once Congress de-
cided to subject municipalities to liability, there is no strong reason,
and no indication in the legislative history or other contemporary un-
derstanding, not to subject municipalities to liability under generally
applicable liability rules including vicarious liability. As discussed
above, the rejection of the Sherman Amendment, upon which the
Court has relied for not allowing vicarious municipal liability, is not
sufficient authority for rejecting such liability.
119. See McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741 (S.C. 1985).
120. See Hewison v. City of New Haven, 37 Conn. 475, 482-83 (1871); Wilcox v. City of Chi-
cago, 107 Il1. 334, 338 (1883). Municipalities might be liable for corporate or proprietary activity,
i.e., activity for the corporate good of the municipality rather than in the public interest. Id.; see
also Connelly v. City of Sedalia, 2 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928) (holding city not liable
because seizure and conversion of abandoned tires was in furtherance of public good). Further,
municipalities would not be liable for any activity beyond the legal powers of the municipality
under state law, even if the basis of liability would not have been vicarious liability. Municipal
officials could not authorize the municipality to act outside legal bounds. As the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court stated:
As a general rule, the [municipal] corporation is not responsible for the unauthorized
and unlawful acts of its officer, though done colore officii; it must further appear, that
they were expressly authorized to do the acts, by the city government, or that they were
done bona fide in pursuance of a general authority to act for the city, on the subject to
which they relate; or that, in either case, the act was adopted and ratified by the
corporation.
Thayer v. City of Boston, 36-37 Mass. (19 Pick.) 511, 516-17 (1837).
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Further, even if it was clearly established that in 1871 municipalities
would not have been vicariously liable in tort, the Court has allowed
for incorporation of subsequent developments into § 1983 rules so
that § 1983 does not become outdated and anachronistic. 121 Because
municipal liability and vicarious municipal liability are well estab-
lished today, given Congress' choice to include municipalities in the
group of potential § 1983 defendants, liability rules in keeping with
mainstream tort law should apply.
The fact that most conduct giving rise to § 1983 liability is inten-
tional, willful, or malicious does not present a serious obstacle to vica-
rious municipal liability. For example, with regard to police officers
and other officials authorized to use force, vicarious liability for exces-
sive force is well within established liability rules. 122 Courts have also
allowed vicarious liability for assault and battery even by employees
not generally required to use force as long as "the act .. is done in
the course of doing the master's work, and for the purpose of accom-
plishing it."'123 While eighteenth century rules may be less generous to
plaintiffs, there is ample authority in both eighteenth century and cur-
rent law for holding employers vicariously liable for intentional torts,
such as assault and battery, if the employee is authorized or expected
to use force on the job or if the conduct occurred in furtherance of the
employer's business.
Regarding cases in which the employee appears to act out of purely
personal motives, such as sexual harassment or sexual assault, there
are a variety of possibilities. One court, for example, affirmed vicari-
ous liability for sexual assault because the assault occurred "in the
course of employment" even though the assault appeared to have
been motivated by purely personal aims. 24 Other courts have not al-
lowed vicarious liability for sex crimes, on the ground that such con-
duct is not ordinarily within the scope of employment since it is
motivated by personal concerns and not out of a desire to further the
121. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1983).
122. See W. PROSSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 70, at 464 (4th ed. 1971). Recent cases confirm that
employers are vicariously liable for assault and battery when the employee is authorized or ex-
pected to use force. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. Reddick, 398 A.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Ct. App.
1979).
123. Rego v. Thomas Bros. Corp., 164 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Mass. 1960). The Rego court relied
upon Levi v. Brooks, 121 Mass. 501 (1877), in which the court held an employer liable for an
assault and battery that occurred while the employee was repossessing the victim's property on
behalf of the employer. Id. at 505.
124. See Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding employer may be liable for
sexual assault by deliveryman who raped patron who failed to pay cash for C.O.D. order; deliv-
eryman told victim he was a rapist, suggesting personal, not business related, motivation for
assault).
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employer's interests.125 Federal courts could develop a body of law, in
§ 1983 cases, to distinguish those cases in which vicarious liability
should exist from those cases in which it should not.126 While the
principles underlying this body of law may be drawn from state law
and other sources, ultimately it would be a set of federal rules
designed to govern § 1983 cases.
In sum, if federal courts looked to traditional sources for filling gaps
in § 1983, including the common law of 1871 and contemporary com-
mon law principles, vicarious municipal liability would be justifiable.
If Congress' decision to include municipalities in the universe of
§ 1983 defendants is taken seriously, there is ample authority for fed-
eral courts to develop a set of vicarious liability rules that would hold
municipalities liable under circumstances similar to those that give rise
to vicarious liability in the private sector. It should also be
remembered that the Court's rejection, until now, of vicarious munici-
pal liability is founded on the dubious foundation of the rejection of
the Sherman Amendment which actually has little if anything to say
regarding whether municipalities should be vicariously liable under
§ 1983. Vicarious municipal liability would be within accepted norms
for construing § 1983.
As we have seen, the result of the Court's reexamination of
Monroe's absolute rule against § 1983 municipal liability is that mu-
nicipalities can be held liable for action taken pursuant to municipal
policy or custom but cannot be held liable merely because a municipal
employee commits a constitutional tort. Because the ban on vicarious
liability is built on the same faulty doctrinal bases as the original ban
on municipal liability, it may ultimately be reexamined. Moneil itself,
however, leaves important questions unanswered, and it is to subse-
quent developments that I now turn.
II. THE MONELL RULE IN OPERATION
Monell left several important questions regarding municipal policy
unanswered. First, how is municipal policy identified? Must there be
a formal action by the highest municipal rulemaking body (such as the
city council) or can policy be made less formally and by officials other
125. See Rabon v. Guardsmark, Inc., 571 F.2d 1277, 1282 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding employer
not liable for security guard's sexual assault); Bratton v. Calkins, 870 P.2d 981, 987 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (determining school district not liable for crimes entailed in sexual relationship be-
tween teacher and student).
126. Federal courts have created a body of law in an analogous situation, applying employer
liability under Title VII for sexual harassment. That body of law examines whether the em-
ployer had sufficient knowledge of the harassment to make the employer responsible for it to the
extent that liability is justified. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 784 (1998).
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than top municipal policymakers? Second, does municipal policy exist
only when action is taken pursuant to a rule that formally purports to
cover a range of situations, or can municipal action taken with only
one instance in mind be deemed municipal policy for liability pur-
poses? While a majority of the Supreme Court continues to support
the Monell rule, the Court has not insisted that municipal policy be
limited to formally adopted, generally stated municipal edicts.
The relative likelihood that municipal governments will have suffi-
cient assets to satisfy a judgment has given plaintiffs a strong incentive
to try to establish that they have been victimized pursuant to a munici-
pal policy even when at first glance it would appear that any violation
occurred at the hands of individual municipal employees. Thus, there
has been a great deal of litigation over the proper application of the
Monell rule, and the intricacies of its application promise to continue
spawning more.
A. Municipal Liability Beyond Pure Legislative Policy
In line with the Court's willingness to find municipal policy beyond
formal decisions of the highest municipal legislative and executive
bodies, the Court has made four key rulings which have opened the
door to the possibility of municipal liability absent a clearly stated un-
constitutional policy. These decisions have in turn created a great
deal of litigation over municipal liability. The first is that municipal
policy does not necessarily have to come from the highest level within
the municipal government. Rather, if an individual employee or
group of employees has final decisionmaking authority over an issue,
then that official's (or body's) decisions represent municipal authority
in an area. 127 For example, if the police chief has final authority to
make rules regarding police officers' proper use of firearms, then the
municipality can be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional torts
resulting from that policy. Second, the Court has found municipal
policy from a single decision by the municipal official with final au-
thority, even if that decision is not formulated as a rule to govern all
cases. For example, the Court held that because the county attorney
had final authority to determine the proper steps police officers
should take in executing arrest warrants, the county attorney's deci-
sion that, in a particular case, officers should forcibly enter an office to
execute a warrant was deemed county policy and thus could lead to
127. Monell itself was a case of this type since it was decisions of the New York City Depart-
ment of Social Services and Board of Education that were challenged, not ordinances promul-
gated by the City Council. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660-61 (1978).
[Vol. 48:627
1999] RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 653
§ 1983 county liability.128 Third, the Court has allowed for the possi-
bility of municipal liability without any formally stated policy at all,
when municipal decisionmaking evidences a gross disregard for the
rights of potential victims. Examples include the failure to train mu-
nicipal employees when training is necessary to avoid violating federal
rights and failure to adequately screen municipal employees when
screening is necessary to avoid violating federal rights. 12 9 Fourth, mu-
nicipal liability does not require that the municipal policy alleged to
have caused the violation itself be unconstitutional. Rather, the viola-
tion may be committed by a municipal official acting pursuant to a
constitutional municipal policy. For example, it is not necessary for
liability to find that the municipality's training or screening policy is
itself unconstitutional, but rather that a constitutional policy was so
deficient that the municipality knew or should have known to a high
degree of certainty that constitutional violations would result.130
These doctrinal developments have encouraged plaintiffs to bring
cases against municipalities claiming that the official who violated
their rights had final authority, that the action in their particular case,
because it came from the official with final authority, represented mu-
nicipal policy or that the municipality failed to adequately train or
screen the employee who committed the violation. These cases have
proven controversial among the justices, some of whom see all claims
of these types as thinly veiled attempts to impose vicarious liability on
the municipality while others view it as perfectly fair to hold munici-
palities responsible under these circumstances. The cases that have
reached the Supreme Court since Moneil can be understood as work-
ing out these issues, with some cases dealing with more than one of
the issues.
For convenience, here are the issues that have transformed the Mo-
nell rule into a complicated morass:
Type One: A municipal official with final authority can make munic-
ipal policy without action by the highest municipal legislative body or
executive official.
Type Two: The actions of an official with final authority may consti-
tute municipal policy even if the official has acted only in one instance
and has not formulated the decision as a general rule to govern similar
situations.
128. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
129. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (failure to screen
employees); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1988) (failure to train employees).
130. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819 (1985) (plurality opinion).
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Type Three: Municipal policy may exist where the municipality has
exhibited gross disregard for the possibility that federal rights will be
violated by failing to train employees adequately or by failing to per-
form adequate background checks on applicants for municipal
employment.
Type Four: Municipal liability is possible even when the municipal
policy alleged to have caused the violation of federal rights is not itself
unconstitutional as long as the violation is closely related to the mu-
nicipal policy.
The first post-Monell Supreme Court case in which municipal liabil-
ity was an issue was Polk County v. Dodson.131 In this case, a con-
victed criminal defendant sued, inter alia, the public defender and the
county that employed her, alleging that the quality of his representa-
tion was constitutionally inadequate. 132 This case is well known for its
holding that a public defender's representation of a criminal defend-
ant is not action "under color of" law as required for § 1983 liabil-
ity.133 The Court also addressed the plaintiff's claim against the
county, which in principle could be a viable claim since the county had
assumed responsibility to provide constitutionally adequate represen-
tation for criminal defendants.134 The Court rejected the plaintiff's
claim against the county for a variety of reasons, the most important
of which was that the Court strongly implied that the county could
only be liable when county policy was itself unconstitutional.1 35 The
Court stated that the claim against the county was foreclosed because
even if the plaintiff "was deprived of a Sixth Amendment right to ef-
fective counsel ... he failed to allege that this deprivation was caused
by any constitutionally forbidden rule or procedure."'1 36
Had the Court stuck with this apparent holding and required an
unconstitutional policy for municipal liability, the issues surrounding
municipal liability might have remained relatively simple. Soon after
Dodson, however, the possibility of liability without an unconstitu-
tional municipal policy was acknowledged, thus inaugurating the line
131. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
132. Id. at 312.
133. Id. at 326.
134. Id.
135. The Court gave two reasons for rejecting county liability in addition to the reason dis-
cussed in text. First, the Court held that insofar as the claim was founded upon a theory of
respondeat superior, the claim was foreclosed by Monell. Id. Second, the Court appeared to
have held that the representation was not constitutionally inadequate. The defendant's com-
plaint was that the public defender would not prosecute a frivolous appeal, and, as the Court
noted, "a policy of withdrawal from frivolous cases would not violate the Constitution." Id.
136. Id.
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of cases categorized above as Type Four. In City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle,137 the plaintiff sued after her husband was shot and killed by a
city police officer.138 She alleged that the shooting was unconstitu-
tional and that it was caused by a city policy of inadequate training of
police officers. 139 The plaintiff's problem was that she had proof of
only one incident of excessive force, and the Court rejected her argu-
ment that a policy of inadequate training could be proven by a single
incident. 140 In a plurality opinion for four Justices, Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that when a municipal policy is itself unconstitutional, a
single application of that policy is sufficient to create municipal liabil-
ity.141 Because the alleged policy of inadequate training was not itself
unconstitutional, Justice Rehnquist stated "where the policy relied
upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the
single incident will be necessary in every case to establish both the
requisite fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connec-
tion between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation.' 42 Jus-
tice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by two others, agreed
that there must be a substantial causal relationship between the mu-
nicipal policy and the violation for liability to be imposed on the mu-
nicipality. 43 For present purposes, the important point is that a
majority of the Court acknowledged that the municipal policy itself
does not need to be unconstitutional, only that the constitutional vio-
lation be sufficiently connected to municipal policy that might itself be
constitutional. 144
The possibility of liability based on a constitutional municipal policy
coupled with the relatively unclear causation and fault requirements
the Court has imposed regarding such liability creates the potential
for a large number of claims against municipalities. It is always possi-
ble to trace a municipal employee's constitutional violation to a mu-
nicipal policy, such as the decision to create the municipal department
for which the employee works. While a claim based upon a municipal
policy of establishing, for example, a police department would not
137. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
138. Id. at 805.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 808-09.
141. Id. at 824.
142. Id. Justice Rehnquist, however, did not commit himself to the rule that a constitutional
policy can ever be sufficient for municipal liability. He noted that he was not deciding whether
the municipal policy that is not unconstitutional is ever sufficient. Id. at 824 n.7. But his state-
ment in text does not make much sense without such a rule.
143. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 833 n.9.
144. Id. at 824.
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meet Tuttle's fault and causation requirements. 145 The Tuttle opinions
and subsequent decisions leave a great deal of uncertainty regarding
just where those limits are.
The Court's next major § 1983 municipal liability decision, Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati,146 raised issues of final authority (Type One) and
in one instance, not formulated as a general rule (Type Two). In
Pembaur, county deputy sheriffs violated Pembaur's Fourth Amend-
ment rights by forcibly entering his medical office to serve capiases on
two of his employees, who were sought as witnesses to Pembaur's al-
leged criminally fraudulent billing of state welfare agencies for medi-
cal services.' 47 Pembaur refused to admit the deputies to the office to
serve the capiases on the employees.1 48 The deputies called their su-
pervisor who told them to call an assistant prosecutor and follow his
instructions.' 49 They called the assistant prosecutor who in turn called
the county prosecutor himself.a50 The county prosecutor's instructions
were "go in and get" the witnesses, and the deputies did so by forcing
open the door with the help of Cincinnati city police.151
The first issue raised by Pembaur was whether the county prosecu-
tor had final authority over the decision in this case such that the pros-
ecutor's policy regarding service of capiases would constitute county
policy.' 52 On this issue, the court of appeals concluded that under
Ohio law, the sheriff and prosecutor had final authority to make
county policy on law enforcement matters. 53 The opinions at the
Supreme Court level are unclear on the basis for holding that the
prosecutor had final authority to establish law enforcement policy for
the county, and subsequent developments reveal why. In a subse-
quent municipal liability case, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,54 the
plurality opinion, for four justices, stated that "whether a particular
official has 'final policymaking authority' is a question of state law.' 55
While the preceding statement was essentially quoted from Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion in Pembaur, he vehemently disagreed
145. Id.
146. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
147. The Supreme Court held that "the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from searching
an individual's home or business without a search warrant even to execute an arrest warrant for
a third person." Id. at 474 (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981)).
148. Id. at 472.
149. Id. at 473.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 475.
153. Id. at 476.
154. 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
155. Id. at 123 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added)).
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with this conclusion in Praprotnik, stating that while "state law will
naturally be the appropriate starting point.., ultimately the factfinder
must determine where such policymaking authority actually resides,
and not simply 'where the applicable law purports to put it.' "156 Thus,
the Court could not agree even on the appropriate source of law for
determining whether an official has final policymaking authority. This
is a recipe for continued uncertainty.
The Court appears now to have a majority for the view that state
law largely governs the determination of whether an official has au-
thority to make policy for a municipality, although allowance is made
for departing from state law, albeit in as yet undisclosed circum-
stances. In McMillian v. Monroe County, 57 the Court, in a five-four
decision, determined that the county sheriff was actually a state offi-
cial and thus did not make policy for the county. 158 The Court's opin-
ion stated that while state law was not absolutely dispositive, "our
understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a
particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the
official's functions under relevant state law."159 Interestingly, the dis-
sent did not disagree with the Court's focus on state law, it simply
read that law differently. 160
Praprotnik illustrated another problem that arises in final authority
cases, namely the importance of distinguishing between final decision-
making authority and final policymaking authority. An official is not
a policymaker merely because he or she is vested with final decision-
making authority over an area, unless he or she is also vested with
authority to establish the standards under which that authority is exer-
156. Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126) (plurality
opinion).
157. 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
158. Id. at 783. The Court held that Alabama county sheriffs were state officials and not
county officials even though the sheriffs are paid by the county, receive their equipment from the
county, are elected by county voters, and have jurisdiction only within county borders. Id. at
791. The Court found more compelling provisions of the Alabama constitution and laws that
explicitly designate county sheriffs as state officials with authority to enforce state law within
county borders. Id. at 790. The Court also found it persuasive that no county official has the
power to direct the sheriff's activities, including the highest legislative and executive county offi-
cials. Id. at 791.
159. Id. at 786. Additional support for the view that the Court has decided that state law
practically governs the determination of whether an official lies in the Court's deference to the
Court of Appeals on the issue in light of that court's greater expertise in the law of states within
its jurisdiction. Id. The only qualification expressed by the Court is that states cannot negate all
municipal liability by designating municipal policymakers as state officials. Id. Rather, munici-
pal liability is precluded only when the official is genuinely a state, and not municipal, official.
Id. at 787.
160. Id. at 795-803.
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cised. Returning to Praprotnik, the plaintiff, a city employee, suffered
adverse employment actions allegedly in violation of his First Amend-
ment rights.161 He sued his supervisors and the city.162 He argued
that the employment actions of his supervisors constituted municipal
policy because they had final authority over employment actions
within their departments. 163 The Court held, however, that municipal
liability was improper because even if the individual decisions of the
supervisors were not reviewed by higher municipal officials, the super-
visors were expected to operate within guidelines established legisla-
tively by the mayor and aldermen or administratively by the city Civil
Service Commission. 164 These higher officials made policy which
lower officials executed, with or without review.' 65 Municipalities are
not liable merely because an official has the authority to make a final
decision, the official must also have the final authority to formulate
the policies under which the decision is made.
The second issue in Pembaur is the Type Two issue regarding
whether the advice rendered by the county prosecutor to "go in and
get" the witnesses was a decision rightly called policy. As Justice Pow-
ell pointed out in the dissent, the Court focused on whether the prose-
cutor had the authority to make policy and not on whether the
prosecutor had actually done so in the particular case. 166 Perhaps the
general rule was the opposite, but special circumstances in the particu-
lar case-that the premises were those of the witnesses' employer and
that the employer was the subject of the investigation-justified the
search. 167 Most likely, there was no general rule and the county pros-
ecutor made a decision with the particular situation in mind without
thinking about a general rule. 168 In its most natural understanding,
"policy" connotes a decision designed (and perhaps also phrased) to
govern more than just the case at hand. There was no allegation in
Pembaur that the county attorney had made a general rule that busi-
nesses could be searched without a warrant to find witnesses. Justice
161. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 112.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 129-31 (plurality opinion); see id. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 492 (Powell, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
168. There is no suggestion in Pembaur that the county policy of seeking the county prosecu-
tor's advice is sufficient to create county liability. That innocuous policy would probably not,
under the Court's standards, be sufficiently connected to any resulting violation to create county
liability on its own. However, the fact that it was county policy to consult the prosecutor meant
that the prosecutor had policymaking authority for the county over law enforcement matters
such as that at issue in Pembaur.
[Vol. 48:627
1999] RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 659
Powell argued that whether policy exists can be discerned using two
factors, first whether a decision was stated as a general rule to govern
all similar situations and second whether it was formulated in a poli-
cymaking process.169 In his view, neither factor pointed in favor of
finding a policy in Pembaur.'70
There are hints here of a fundamental disagreement within the
Court over what it means for an official to make policy. The majority
in Pembaur may have been of the opinion that' if a municipality has no
stated general rule, then whatever the official with final authority does
is municipal policy. The dissent would disagree and argue that this is,
in effect, vicarious liability for the decisions of the official with final
authority. The dissent's reasoning means that if the municipality has
no general rule on a subject (which, given the number of issues that
can arise, may describe the majority of cases), then there can be no
municipal liability. To the dissent, when no general rule exists, then
municipal liability for the conduct of an official in a particular case is
vicarious liability, not liability based on municipal policy or custom.
This conflict over the nature of policy is illustrated best by cases
raising Type Three "gross disregard" issues where claims against mu-
nicipalities are framed in terms of municipal failure to adequately
train employees, failure to maintain a safe workplace for employees or
failure to adequately screen employees for their positions. City of
Canton v. Harris'71 is the most important of these cases. In Harris, an
arrestee sued over the failure of police officers to summon medical
help while she was in custody. 172 After her arrest, Harris slumped to
the ground twice and was incoherent when asked whether she needed
medical attention.173 Ultimately the police just left her lying on the
floor until after she was released from custody, at which time she was
admitted to the hospital for treatment of emotional illness.' 74 Her
claim against the city was based on the city's delegation of authority
over whether to summon medical help to the police shift commander
coupled with the city's failure to train shift commanders on whether
an arrestee needed treatment for emotional illness.' 75
169. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 499-502 (PoweUl, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist).
170. Id.
171. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
172. Id. at 378.
173. Id. at 381.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 381-83.
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The municipality's stated policy in Harris was to provide medical
treatment to arrestees whenever necessary. 176 Thus, it could be ar-
gued that the shift commander's failure to summon help for Harris
violated municipal policy and thus should not give rise to municipal
liability. The Court, however, unanimously agreed that under certain
circumstances, a municipality could be held liable for failing to train
its employees to avoid constitutional violations. In the words of the
concurring Justices, "where municipal policymakers are confronted
with an obvious need to train city personnel to avoid the violation of
constitutional rights and they are deliberately indifferent to that need,
the lack of necessary training may be appropriately considered a city
'policy' subjecting the city itself to liability."'1 77
The Court's standard in Harris for deciding whether a municipal
policy caused the violation hints at something that later became more
explicit: the determination of whether a municipal policy is present
depends in part on whether the municipality is culpable for the viola-
tion.178 In Harris, the determination of whether a policy existed
turned on whether the municipality was culpable by being deliberately
indifferent to the medical needs of detainees. 179 What looks like a
positive issue ("is there a municipal policy?") has become the explic-
itly normative question of whether the case is an appropriate one, in
terms of culpability, to hold the city responsible for its contribution to
the constitutional violation. Every municipality chooses a level of
training for all employees so municipal policy is always implicated for
violations caused by lack of proper training. Municipal § 1983 liability
is proper only when the city policy is somehow faulty. In the case of
inadequate training, it is only when the need for training to avoid vio-
lations is so obvious that the failure to provide the training establishes
that municipal policymakers-those whose duties include establishing
proper training regimens-made a deliberate choice to provide inade-
quate training.
Harris helps answer a set of Type One questions concerning identi-
fying municipal policies that can give rise to liability. Innocuous poli-
cies such as the decision to establish a police force or zoning board are
176. Id. at 381 n.2.
177. Harris, 489 U.S. at 393 (O'Connor, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., concurring);
see id. at 388.
178. The plurality in Tuttle had also stated the issue as one of causation and fault. City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1998). More recently, in Board of County Commis-
sioners v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997), the Court stated much more forcefully that municipal
liability depends, in some cases, on whether the municipality was at fault in causing the violation.
Id. at 415.
179. Harris, 489 U.S. at 389.
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not sufficient, even though violations may be causally linked to such
policies. 180 To create liability, a municipal policy must either itself be
unconstitutional or evidence a conscious disregard for potential vic-
tims of constitutional violations. 181 Only in one of these two situations
will the Court find that a constitutional violation has been caused by
municipal policy. Further, the causal link between the faulty munici-
pal policy and the violation must be close.182 These are not precise
standards, and they contribute to making municipal § 1983 liability a
difficult and complicated body of rules.
While the Harris standard is a difficult one for plaintiffs to meet,
because it did not cut off inadequate training and similar claims alto-
gether, it created a significant amount of litigation alleging that munic-
ipal failures similar to failure to train constituted policies sufficient to
create liability. Two examples that reached the Supreme Court are
failure to provide a safe workplace' 83 and failure to adequately screen
municipal employees before hiring.' 84
In Collins v. City of Harker Heights,185 a municipal worker was
killed because of an unsafe condition at the workplace. 86 The
worker's widow sued the city, alleging that the unsafe condition was
the result of the city's deliberate indifference to the safety of its em-
ployees.' 87 The Court assumed, without deciding, that this allegation
was sufficient to raise the possibility of municipal liability.188 The
Court, however, rejected the constitutional claim on the basis that mu-
nicipal workers have no constitutional right to a safe workplace, and
thus even if the worker's death was the result of deliberate indiffer-
ence, there could be no § 1983 liability without a constitutional viola-
tion. 189 The confusion that led to Collins is understandable because
the "deliberate indifference" standard for municipal liability closely
resembles some standards for finding substantive liability, such as the
standard used to judge whether prison medical care violates the
Eighth Amendment. However, Collins reminds us that for § 1983 mu-
nicipal liability to exist, there must be both a municipal policy and a
violation of federal rights. 190
180. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823 (plurality opinion).
181. Harris, 489 U.S. at 379.
182. Id.
183. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
184. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
185. 503 U.S. 115.
186. Id. at 117.
187. Id. at 117-18.
188. Id. at 124.
189. Id. at 126.
190. Id. at 128-29.
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B. Board of County Commissioners v. Brown
The Court's most recent § 1983 municipal liability case involved an
allegation that a county sheriff hired the son of his nephew as a deputy
without reviewing the nephew's criminal record in detail. 191 The dep-
uty/nephew had been convicted of various traffic offenses and misde-
meanors, including assault and battery.192 The deputy was later sued
under § 1983 for a Fourth Amendment violation when he allegedly
forcibly pulled a passenger out of a car that had been involved in a
high speed chase and threw her to the ground, causing injuries to her
knees that required surgery.193 The victim also sued the county,
claiming that the sheriff was the county policymaker regarding hiring
deputies and that his failure to review in detail his nephew's criminal
record amounted to a county policy of inadequate screening of candi-
dates for deputy. 194
The county in Brown conceded that the sheriff was the policy-
maker regarding the sheriff's department.1 95 The plaintiff argued that
since the sheriff was the policymaker, anything he did, whether an in-
dividual decision or a general rule, constituted municipal policy.1 96 It
was argued this was not vicarious liability because the authority of the
municipality itself has been delegated to the sheriff. Thus, the actions
of the sheriff within the sphere of delegated authority constituted ac-
tions of the municipality itself.197
The Court's reaction to this argument was to insist on what appears
to be a stricter standard for municipal liability than what had been
previously articulated. The Court stated:
As our § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates, how-
ever, it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify con-
duct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must
also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipal-
ity was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. That is, a
plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the
requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal
link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal
rights .... Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not
directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee
to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be
191. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 401 (1997).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 400-02.
194. Id. at 402.
195. Id. at 401.
196. Id. at 404.
197. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. This argument was also accepted by the Court of Appeals. Id.
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applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for
the actions of its employees. 198
The final statement in the language quoted above reveals the moti-
vation for this strict standard: the Court appears concerned that cases
raising Type Three issues involving failure to train, supervise, screen,
protect, or similar claims are attempts to hold municipalities liable for
the conduct of the untrained, unsupervised or unscreened employee.
Further, municipal liability for every action by municipal officials with
final authority in an area will amount to vicarious liability for the ac-
tions of a large number of officials since a great deal of municipal
business is undoubtedly carried on by officials with final authority and
little guidance from municipal legislative bodies or higher executive
officials.
Later in Brown, the Court elaborated on the high standard of culpa-
bility it was imposing in cases of inadequate screening of employ-
ees. 199 It stated that:
"[D]eliberate indifference" is a stringent standard of fault, requir-
ing proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action .... A plaintiff must demonstrate that a
municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a
violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow
the decision. Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant's back-
ground would lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that the
plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant
would be the deprivation of a third party's federally protected right
can the official's failure to adequately scrutinize the applicant's
background constitute "deliberate indifference.
20 0
On the facts of the particular case, the Court concluded that the
deputy's record was not so bad that the sheriff would have known, had
he checked, that excessive force was the likely result.
20 1
The fact that Burns had pleaded guilty to traffic offenses and
other misdemeanors may have made him an extremely poor candi-
date for reserve deputy. Had Sheriff Moore fully reviewed Burns'
record, he might have come to precisely that conclusion. But unless
he would necessarily have reached that decision because Burns' use
of excessive force would have been a plainly obvious consequence
of the hiring decision, Sheriff Moore's inadequate scrutiny of
Burns's record cannot constitute "deliberate indifference" to re-
spondent's federally protected right to be free from a use of exces-
sive force. 202
198. Id. at 405.
199. Id. at 411.
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 414.
202. Id.
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The Court's reasoning here was confused at best. It appears that
the Court linked the degree of culpability to what the sheriff would
have found had he checked the deputy's record more carefully. But
normally the degree of culpability must be determined ex ante, with
regard to the potential consequences from the chosen course of ac-
tion, since it is impossible to know the actual consequences at the time
the potentially culpable decision is made. The decision of how deeply
to check an applicant's background is made by considering the duties
of the position for which the applicant is applying, the harm that a
person in that position can cause, and the likelihood that unfavorable
information will be uncovered. The actual content of the applicant's
background is by definition unknown when the decision of how
deeply to check is made, so it is difficult to understand why the Court
thinks that the content of the applicant's background is relevant to the
official's and thus the city's culpability for not checking it.
The content of the applicant's background is relevant to causation
of the violation, not culpability for failing to check the applicant's
background. If a thorough check of an applicant's background would
have revealed nothing negative, then a failure to check the applicant's
background could not have caused a violation. For example, failing to
check the background of an applicant for a position in a childcare
center may be extremely culpable given the potential for great harm
through child abuse. If, however, an applicant's record was com-
pletely clean, the failure to check the background would not be a
cause of any abuse that occurred after the applicant was hired. The
element of "deliberate indifference" to potential plaintiffs' federal
rights should be determined by examining the duties of the position
for which the candidate is applying, not by the content of the particu-
lar applicant's record. The Court, however, repeatedly treats the issue
as one of culpability, not causation.
The majority's extremely hostile reaction to the plaintiff's claim (so
hostile that it led Justice O'Connor to state a completely illogical stan-
dard of culpability) is attributable to the Court's fear that Type Three
cases, especially those founded upon hiring decisions, are disguised
vicarious liability claims.20 3 The Court could easily foreclose all claims
raising Type Three issues by holding that training, screening and other
similar failings are not "policies or customs" within the Court's munic-
203. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 413 ("Cases involving constitutional injuries allegedly traceable to
an ill-considered hiring decision pose the greatest risk that a municipality will be held liable for
an injury it did not cause."). The Court's reference here to causation shows that the Court
collapsed questions of culpability into questions of causation, and should have referred to causa-
tion when it referred to culpability.
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ipal liability standards, or that the causal link between such failings
and violations is never sufficient. A majority of the Court, however, is
apparently unwilling to do so.
The Court in Brown, did suggest a holding that would not have suf-
fered from the same flawed reasoning as its culpability holding. The
Court noted that in all previous cases, the sheriff had adequately
screened the backgrounds of candidates for deputy and that the fail-
ure to screen this deputy's background "can only be described as a
deviation from Sheriff Moore's ordinary hiring practices. ' 20 4 In Type
Three cases, where the training or screening is normally adequate, but
the decisionmaker deviates from usual practice, perhaps the true "pol-
icy" of the municipality is to employ usual practices, not the deviant
ones. This reasoning works only in Type Two cases where liability is
founded upon one-time actions by a policymaker who is acting on a
single case and does not purport to establish a rule to govern future
cases-the act of promulgating an unconstitutional general rule
should give rise to liability even if it is the only defective rule among
thousands.
The Court has thus changed the focus in Type Three cases from
locating a municipal policy or custom and asking whether that policy
or custom caused the violation, to applying a culpability standard
under which municipalities are to be held liable only when the plain-
tiff can prove a high level of municipal culpability for the violation.
The Court does not support this shift with evidence from the legisla-
tive history that culpability was relevant on this issue to the Congress
that wrote and passed § 1983. There is also no textual support for this
culpability inquiry. If culpability is to be the test, then the Court, at a
minimum, should explain its derivation and should explicitly reform
the Monell test to reflect this rather significant change.205
III. MUNICIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
The case against maintaining the Monell rule is strong from a vari-
ety of perspectives. The rule is so complicated that a change to a more
definite rule, whether expanding or shrinking municipal liability,
could save litigation expenses. Because plaintiffs who ultimately lose
204. Id. at 410.
205. In a recent administrative law decision, the Court criticized an agency for applying a legal
standard in a manner that was not consistent with the standard's verbal formulation. Allentown
Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998). The Court held that an agency that
applies a standard in a way that cannot be squared with the language of the standard is not
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. Id. It seems that the Court's application of the Monell
test fails the Court's own test for reasoned decisionmaking, since the standard itself refers only
to policy and custom and makes no mention of culpability as relevant to municipal liability.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
their claims for municipal liability often can state plausible claims,
plaintiffs attorneys and municipalities spend a great deal of time and
money on litigation that could be avoided by a more definite rule.
Judicial time could also be saved if judges did not have to decide diffi-
cult questions regarding the proper application of the Monell rule.
In my view, fairness concerns as well as the policies underlying
§ 1983, point toward a rule of vicarious liability. When a person has
been injured by a violation of federal rights committed by a municipal
employee in the course of employment, the municipality is responsible
for the violation in the same way that private employers are responsi-
ble for the torts of their employees. From the point of view of a mu-
nicipal employee who committed the violation in good faith, it is
unfair that the focus of civil rights litigation is on the individual, rather
than the employing entity.20 6 From the victim's point of view, several
considerations point toward allowing the claim to be brought directly
against the municipality.
The common law's widespread acceptance of vicarious liability ex-
hibits a consensus that employers are responsible for the tortious con-
duct of their employees. The municipal employer benefits from the
employee's activities and may also save money by not supervising the
employee more closely. The employee would not have been in the
position to commit the violation if it were not for the municipality's
decision to pursue whatever program the employee was involved in.
Often, municipalities are behind violations in ways that are difficult to
prove and would not stand up to scrutiny under the Moneil rule. Fail-
ure to train allegations and similar claims are too difficult for plaintiffs
to make out even when it is common knowledge that a particular mu-
nicipality encourages or ignores wayward behavior on the part of its
officials. 20 7 Individual officials may also get sympathy within the judi-
cial system that would not be a factor if claims could be brought
against municipalities themselves. Immunities and the realities of the
assets that individual municipal employees are likely to have make
damages sufficient to meet § 1983's compensation goal difficult to re-
cover. For all these reasons, fairness counsels strongly in favor of a
significant expansion of municipal liability.
These fairness concerns would be beside the point if Congress had
intended to confine municipal liability to the bounds established in
206. Many municipalities recognize this and indemnify their employees, but not all of them do
SO.
207. Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (holding action seeking injunctive relief against a
pattern of abuse by Philadelphia law enforcement officials did not to present case or controversy
within federal judicial power).
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Moneil. But, as Justice Stevens has argued, the Court, and not Con-
gress, is responsible for the doctrinal mess that is the Moneil rule.2 0 8
Relying on the remedial purposes of § 1983 as well as the common law
of vicarious liability at the time § 1983 was passed, Justice Stevens has
concluded that Congress intended "to impose liability for the govern-
ments' own illegal acts-including those acts performed by their
agents in the course of their employment. '20 9 He has made a persua-
sive case against the doctrinal foundations of the Monell rule. 210
Justice Breyer, joined by two additional members of the Court, re-
cently called for a reexamination of the Moneil rule.211 Justice Breyer
agreed with Justice Stevens that Congress' rejection of the Sherman
Amendment was not a sufficient basis for the Monell Court's rejection
of vicarious liability. 212 Justice Breyer also argues that vicarious liabil-
ity satisfies § 1983's causation requirement because the municipality
itself is responsible for the actions of municipal employees.2 13 Finally,
Justice Breyer made a compelling case that the Monell rule is fraught
with needless complications that do not help to identify municipal pol-
icies in any meaningful sense.2 14
Justice Breyer also pointed out that many states authorize indemni-
fication of employees found liable in civil rights cases, but he erred
when he stated that an indemnification regime mimics vicarious liabil-
ity.2 15 Indemnification is a poor substitute for vicarious liability be-
cause employees retain their immunities and because to a jury it may
still appear that any damages may be paid out of the employee's own
pocket. While indemnification resolves the employee's fairness con-
cerns, and may help some victims recover their damages, it does not
resolve all of the difficulties of the Monell rule.
The conflict over the Moneil rule is another instance of disagree-
ments that exist regarding the proper scope of § 1983 liability gener-
ally. The justices who support the Monell rule may view many civil
rights cases brought against municipalities and their employees as, in
reality, simple tort cases that belong in state court. From the plain-
tiff's perspective, however, state court tort remedies are insufficient.
First, the victorious plaintiff would not, in state court under tort law,
208. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City
of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 835-40 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 489 (Stevens, J., concurring).
210. Id.
211. Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 430-36 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 430-32.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 433.
215. Id. at 436.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
be entitled to an award of attorney fees as provided for under federal
civil rights law.2 16 Second, municipalities may not be required to pay
full damages under state law. Many states impose limits on the dam-
ages recoverable against government entities, limits which probably
would not apply in a federal civil rights action.2 17 These limitations
may be sensible as matters of state policy, but they are in fundamental
conflict with the purposes of federal law, and should not be relied
upon as a substitute for liability under § 1983.
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994).
217. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). The Court granted certiorari in a case concern-
ing whether limits on wrongful death damages apply in § 1983 claims brought in state court, but
the Court ended up deciding that the case was not reviewable because there was no final judg-
ment in the state court. Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1998).
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